

Turkey Holds the Key to the Caucasus Conflict

Yasin Aslan

Eurasian Studies, Spring 1994

Azerbaijan is going through a tragic period of its history. The wave of the Azerbaijani Popular Front has led Azerbaijan to independence for the second time in its contemporary history. The Azerbaijanis have achieved their goal as a nation: They have established their own state.

Dissident scholar Abulfaz Elchibey was elected president of Azerbaijan in early July 1992, following the seizure of power by the Azerbaijani Popular Front. The victory of Elchibey in presidential elections in Azerbaijan was a crucial turning point in the geopolitical struggle for influence in the southern belt of the disintegrated Soviet Union.

The consolidation of control by the APF posed a challenge to Russia, which is seeking to reassert its traditional strategic interests in Caucasus and Central Asia through the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Elchibey made no secret of his foreign policy views during his election campaign. In his interview with the weekly Moscow News, Elchibey said, "We will support economic relations with Russia, but we are against Azerbaijan joining the Commonwealth of Independent States. Azerbaijan and Turkey have special ethnic relations. Our peoples are close in language, culture and mentality. Of course, Turkey will enjoy pride of place in Azerbaijan's foreign policy." (1)

Every day Elchibey was effectively making Azerbaijan more independent from Russia. Russian influence in Azerbaijan at that point was somewhat complicated, because the Russians withdrew their troops from Azerbaijan, in accordance with the request of Azerbaijani government (2).

Azerbaijan is the first former Soviet republic where the Russian troops were withdrawn. Some local politicians sharply criticized this move, saying that this measure made Azerbaijan more vulnerable to foreign influence, but when taking into account the fact that Russian troops still remain in Baltic States, this was one of Elchibey's most important achievements(3).

Over the next 12 months, military setbacks in Nagorno-Karabakh and the deterioration of economic situation eroded his support among the population. In early June 1993, Azerbaijani troops launched an attack on the Gyandzha headquarters of military units loyal to Colonel Suret Huseinov, a former commander of Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Military units loyal to Huseinov repelled the attack, took control of Gyandzha and started to march on Baku. On the way to Baku, they did not meet with any resistance. Huseinov was accused of planning to overthrow the Azerbaijani government. Following the Gyandzha uprising, Elchibey left Baku for his birthplace Keleki village, in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic to avoid civil war and bloodshed.

A week after Elchibey's departure from Baku, the Azerbaijani Milli Mejlis (National Assembly) voted to transfer his powers to the Parliamentary Speaker Haydar Aliiev, Elchibey denounced this move as unconstitutional and continued to insist that he remained the legally-

elected president of the country. Some Western governments, including U.S. and Turkey, shared this view.

The Musavat Party leader Isa Gambar, former speaker of the parliament, noted that the decision of the Milli Mejlis on June 24, 1993, to strip Elchibey of his presidential powers was, in fact, a military-state coup performed in Azerbaijan (4). Isa Gambar later pointed out that the influence of the oil factor on the developments of June and events witnessed by the republic was not to be excluded. As confirmation, he presented the Cabinet's June 23 decree, which stopped the signing of all declarations with Western companies regarding the development of oil fields in the Caspian Sea as well as bank operations with foreign partners (5).

The weekly Moscow News also shared Isa Gambar's views and even went further: Moscow News remarked that the issue was not only Azerbaijan's oil reserves proper, but the strategic position held by Azerbaijan on Eurasia's oil map. It is in the center of a vast oil-bearing belt stretching from Tyumen to the Persian Gulf, and simultaneously provides the only possible geographical alternative of an outlet to the West by passing Russia, both for Chechnya with its oil-refining capacities and for Central Asia with its energy sources. Azerbaijan also has an established sectoral infrastructure, from skilled personnel to a specialized economy. Securing the control over the Azerbaijani bridgehead would make it possible to control the entire region (6). According to the paper, therefore, despite the entire drama of the situation, created by the recent Armenian offensive and the reaction it triggered worldwide, there is a need for sober calculation in appraising it.

Oil is not new to Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani oil fields were first exploited in 1872, rapidly swelling the fortress of Baku into a wealthy oil capital. From 1872 to 1992, over 1.3 billion tons of oil was extracted. During the Soviet rule alone, over one billion tons of oil was exploited. Taking this fact into account, it will be clear what a big role Azerbaijani oil played in the development of the Soviet economy (7).

According to Azerbaijani oil experts, Moscow focused its attention and investment in recent decades on Siberian oil fields rather than the oil fields in Azerbaijan bordering on the volatile Middle East. Moscow deliberately underreported the reserves in the Caspian, and it was only with the collapse of the Soviet Union that three new major fields known as "Chirag", "Guneshli" and "Azeri" became fully appreciated. The newly discovered "Shahdeniz" oil field has not been fully given over to use (8).

Of all the Soviet republics, one that could see its Standard of living change dramatically in the next few years is Azerbaijan. Once one of the backward republics, it is believed to be sitting on a vast and poorly-exploited oil wealth. Azerbaijan has 500 million tons of discovered oil reserve (9). Yet, before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the unemployment rate in Azerbaijan was 28 per cent, the highest among the former Soviet republics (10).

The prospect of a transformation of Azerbaijan's economy is not universally welcomed. In neighboring Armenia it has provoked alarm. According to the Wall Street Journal, Aram Kirakossian, Armenia's acting Foreign Minister, expressed his country's concern about Britain's role in Azerbaijan's growing wealth to the U.K government on a visit to London in October, 1993. "The economic cooperation between Azerbaijan and the U.K for the development of Azeri oil fields has created a special relationship between the countries, but in the light of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it created concerns in Armenia", he added (11).

Armenia would have little chance for survival in the case of a total war without outside support. After Western countries concluded contracts with Azerbaijan, the U.S and Britain showed more sympathy toward Azerbaijan with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh. These economic interests would motivate the West to push for stability in the region.

In an interview on Russian TV, Azerbaijani Parliamentary Speaker Rasul Guliev said Armenia would be unable to continue the war for five more years without aid from abroad. Armenia's current total industrial output was about 10 per cent of that before the collapse of the USSR. "Armenia cannot afford to buy a single tank", said the speaker. "Armenia's primary financial source is the Armenian community living abroad, some Western states and some CIS states." he added (12).

Statistics indicate that the Armenian economy has collapsed. According to Armenia's Snark News Agency, only 35 boxes of matches can be bought with the minimum salary in Armenia. And the republic recently was the most prosperous in the USSR. In 1990, 99 of every 100 Armenian families possessed refrigerators, 92 washing machines, 72 sewing machines, 58 tape recorders and 28 cars. Nowadays, most families spend 80 per cent of their incomes on food. According to UNICEF accounts, a family is on the edge of starvation if it spends 75 per cent of its budget on food (13).

Before the Nagorno-Kabarakh conflict started, Azerbaijan used to produce 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year (14).

According to Georg Pogolian, director of Sociological Research Center of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, about 500,000-600,000 persons left Armenia in 1992-1993. In Pogolian's view, 70 per cent of the Armenian population are potential émigrés. This trend will be harmful, because the most skilled and active persons are leaving the republic and those leaving now are unlikely to return in the future (15).

The economies of neighboring countries of the Caucasus have been destroyed by civil war. But in Azerbaijan, food and petrol, the first commodities to be affected by any conflict, are still plentiful and cheap. (16).

The Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict became the first "hot spot" in the territory of the former USSR. Karabakh turned into a Caucasian Pandora's box.

Fighting spilled far beyond its borders and exceeded its self-determination limits last year when Armenian forces not only established firm control over Karabakh itself, but seized large chunks of Azerbaijani territory to the west and south. Azerbaijan lost about 20 per cent of its territory. It was on the verge of being cut by half. It was admitted in Baku that the very statehood of Azerbaijan was in danger (17).

Armenia has pursued a scorched earth policy in the occupied territories. According to the Azerbaijani Statistics Bureau, since the start of Armenian aggression, about 1000 villages have been burned or destroyed, of which 219 are in Nagorno-Karabakh, and including one in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, 692 are beyond the enclave (18). Chairman of the Commission on POW's and Hostages Namik Abbasov, at a press conference held in Baku, reported that at least 4,000 Azerbaijanis, the majority of whom are peaceful residents, were being held in Armenian captivity. According to Abbasov, the Azerbaijani side had stopped taking hostages since July 1993, while Armenians still take hostages. Abbasov stressed that the conditions for Azerbaijani hostages didn't correspond to human norms. "They are kept like animals," he added. He remarked that the majority of hostages recovered in swaps had serious

infectious diseases (19). In his interview with "Azadliq", he stated that Armenia was pursuing a policy of state-sponsored genocide of Azerbaijani people (20).

When the Kelbajar district in Azerbaijan was captured by Armenian forces, the territory, populated by 60,000 people, was subjected to an ethnic purge. After that, Armenian forces took Ağdam, a strategically- important city, which is a key to the Karabakh plains. As a result, 170,000 people became refugees. Armenian forces supported by Russian army units seized Fuzuli. This also caused a flow of refugees. At the moment seven districts are under the occupation of Armenian forces, there are already over 740.000 refugees and the refugee flow is growing (21).

Senior American diplomat Edward Walker said " Karabakh Armenians should understand that their latest actions harmed them as well. The occupation of Agdam could not be justified by using self-defense as a pretext. The town's occupation only added up human suffering and increased the number of refugees". (22) The Vienna-based "Die Presse" noted that the Armenians are making gains on the battle to win the sympathy of the world opinion". (23) But in the foreign policy field, The "Kelbajar Card" was played by Azerbaijani leaders rather unsuccessfully. The outright aggression in the territories beyond Nagorno-Karabakh could have many unpleasant consequences for the Armenian side. The world community has evidently "swallowed" the capture of Kelbajar and no sanctions were imposed. Such actions were justified when new Azerbaijani territories were seized. (24) On the other hand, a resolution labeling Armenia as an aggressor was turned down by the UN security Council. In the resolution adopted by the Security Council, the Armenian offensive was described as the "invasion of the Kelbajar district by local Armenian forces. " It was an indirect admission of the fact that Karabakh, not Armenia, was the main belligerent.(25) Kelbajar was a delicate matter. The governments of Armenia and Khankendi (Stepanakert) talked as if they might give it back to the Azeris. But the recent invasion of Azeri territories is hugely popular with Armenians, who vow that they will never give it back. The anti-government rhetoric of Ruben Orsepyan, chairman of the rightist Dashnak Party, has clearly been deflated: „Ter-Petrosian is finally doing something right with Kelbajar, but we must hold onto it unless we get real guarantees for Kelbajar's security in return". (26)

There is a common tendency among Armenians that the only solution to the conflict is to intensify the war and to resort to military blackmail. Analyzing the Karabakh war, Armenia's "Golos Armenii" came to the conclusion that Karabakh Armenians should defeat Azerbaijan to bring the hostilities to an end. The paper stated that anyone looking at the arguments offered by each of the warring parties would see that all objective factors, like territory, population, economic potential, strategic resources, allies and foreign assistance, were in favour of Azerbaijan. On the side of Karabakh, there were only subjective factors : the belief in victory, readiness to fight till the end, and discipline. All these are actually connected with the war and disappear when it stops.

According to the same paper, a temporary escalation of hostilities would be the least of all possible evils because it would speed up their end. In the paper's view, the road to peace in Karabakh lies through a military victory for Karabakh and its achievements depend wholly on the Karabakh leadership's determination to take immediate steps to achieve its strategical goals (27). Escalation of the war in the territories beyond Karabakh indicates how successfully Armenians put this scenario on the stage. In Alexander Iskardaryan's view, the editor of the weekly "New Times International", unrecognized by anyone, Karabakh has minimal

possibilities of influencing the world community and positions of interested parties. That is why it has nothing else to do but to resort to military blackmail, and not only by threatening Zangelan district.

According to Iskandaryan, Armenia will use the occupied territories as a bargaining counter. For example, it needs first, to keep the Lachin Corridor linking it with Armenia and, second, to legalize its status. It can threaten with the continuation of the war. Iskandaryan concluded that negotiations would be very difficult since it was incomparably bigger than Karabakh's in strategic terms, as well as that it was impossible to fight endlessly (28). How long will this conflict last and how soon it will be settled? This conflict is not a brief one. This is not a merely a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is linked with global political processes and strong foreign forces are involved in it.

The Azerbaijan-Armenian war may be the most dangerous to have erupted on the southern rim of the former Soviet Union, because the neighboring countries fear that their national interests are jeopardized. Turkey, Iran and Russia are jockeying for political and economical influence in the oil-rich region over which each has exercised authority at some time. "There is a danger of losing geopolitical positions conquered ages ago", said Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev (29).

In an interview in "Russia", political scientist Oleg Tsagolov stated that for Russia to leave the Caucasus would mean to doom itself to new Caucasus wars, to give it to Turkey and Iran and to get a Lebanon on its borders (30). These statements clearly reflect the concerns and ambitions of Russians in the Caucasus.

In late July 1993, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev announced that two Russian bases would be deployed in Armenia. The Armenian government confirmed this. According to Armenia's Snark News Agency, colonel Y.Ivanov from the Russian Defense Ministry visited Yerevan in early August and conferred there with Armenian Defense Ministry leaders on the problem of "deploying Russian troops in Armenia".

One of the two Russian divisions to be stationed in Armenia is planned to be stationed in Idzhevan and Berd districts of Armenia along the border with Azerbaijan (31). About 9.000 troops of the 24th Russian division are deployed in Armenia to patrol the border with Turkey and Iran (32).

Azerbaijani Defense Ministry officials frequently state that the Russian Federation, having declared itself as the successor to the USSR, continues to practice imperial politics, provoking clashes on international soil. Russia is involved in an undeclared war as an undeclared party.

Because of its economic problems, Russia does not want to fight on several fronts and that is why it temporarily froze the Trans-Caucasian conflicts. It is no coincidence that peace processes are going on simultaneously in Azerbaijan and Georgia. The same was done in Trans-Dniester region, where neither the cause of the conflict was removed nor the problem settled.

Examining the changes in Armenian foreign policy, "Golos Armanii" remarked that Armenia's leadership was trying to change its foreign policy orientation, turning its focus to the north. The paper concluded that this was a progressive tendency unless it was changed under the influence of the U.S. and Turkey, the interests of which run openly against those of Russia and Armenia. (33).

Studying Russia's political movements in the Caucasus closely, Armenians try to take maximum advantage and turn Armenia into a factor of stability in the region. The Armenian press confirms such claims. Under the headline "National State Ideal and How to achieve it", the Armenian weekly "Azatamart" remarked that the task of the Armenian side was carefully to study Russia's political maneuvers in the Caucasus and take maximum advantage of them. Consequentially, if possible, Armenia should help those processes which would keep Russia within the state borders along the Caucasian ridge. Bilateral relations between Armenia and Russia demanded the presence of a strong Armenia, according to the paper, otherwise, a poor and parasitic republic sooner or later would be replaced by some other partner (34). In his commentary in "Azatamart". Levon Shirinian examined the Russia's failure in the West and suggested that under the new international order an independent and stable Armenia should be a guarantor of stability and balance of power in the region. Armenia remains indispensable (35).

In his article appearing in one of the January issues of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the political advisor of President Boris Yeltsin and the member of Presidential Council, Andronik Migranian, in a milder tone than Zhirinovsky, suggested the federalization of Azerbaijan and Georgia in order to keep them under the control of Moscow. In Migranian's view, the disintegration process is continuing in Azerbaijan and Georgia (with Adzharia and Mingrelia in Georgia, and the Talyshes, Lezgins, Kurds, and Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan); neither Turkey nor Iran can guarantee the security of those formations, only Russia. Taking special interests in Caucasus into account, Russia must set up its own priorities and steadily defend them, he added (36).

It seems the Armenian leadership was the first to understand the need to play according to Russian rules.

The press of the CIS shows considerable interest in the Turkish-Iranian rivalry for influence among the newly independent Turkic-Muslim states of the former Soviet Union. Commentators discuss this rivalry as not merely a local phenomenon, but also indicative of possible geopolitical changes.

Iran is trying to increase its clout with its neighbors as a battle unfolds with rival Turkey for the influence in Azerbaijan. It has tried to broker peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia in their six-year conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Iran's interest in helping resolve the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is related with the potential danger of its inciting a burst of separatism among its 18-20 million Azerbaijanis (37).

On the cultural front, Azerbaijani students have been invited to study in Iranian cities. A large Iranian bookstore opened in Baku. Iran is playing a direct role in trying to revive Islam and to help Azerbaijan market its oil.

Iran signed several oil agreements with Azerbaijan in early 1993 to upgrade existing oil wells, but little progress has been made because of lack of financial resources. Azerbaijani oil is of vital interest to Iran as it seeks to become a strategic player in Azerbaijan as well as in the landlocked republics of Central Asia. Tehran offers a natural outlet to the Gulf for the transport of oil from Azerbaijan as well as Kazakhstan (38).

Azerbaijan was divided into two parts in 1828, when the territory was divided between Russia and Iran.

Nevertheless, Iran has been losing ground as suspicions have grown in Baku that, despite religious reasons for closeness between Iran and Azerbaijan. Tehran's geopolitical

calculations are pushing it closer to Armenia. Isa Gambar has stated that Iran's stand gave Armenia room for new political maneuvers (39).

Nezavisimaya Gazeta surveyed the situation in the six Turkic-Muslim republics, concluding that Turkey was best prepared in the competition for influence with Western backing and utilization of ethno-religious links, it had the possibility of forming a broad economic commonwealth. The paper considered it difficult to predict the pattern of Iranian ambitions in the region, but noted that with Rafsanjani's election victory, it was likely that efforts would be expanded to develop economic ties with Central Asia (40).

Speculations continue as to who was winning the race for influence in the southern republics of the CIS.

As to Turkey, Haydar Aliev has sought to reverse Elchibey's tilt toward Turkey and Iran in favor of resuming strong ties with Russia. In September 1993, Aliev signed the CIS treaty during a meeting of CIS heads of state in Moscow. Azerbaijan then became the 11th full member of the CIS (41). After Aliev became the president of Azerbaijan, less positive steps were taken in favor of the country and the deterioration of economy continued. Five more districts were seized by Armenian forces and Aliev abolished 33 divisions which would be the nucleus of Azerbaijani national army. Now most Western observers believe that a counterattack by Azerbaijan's demoralized forces is unlikely unless Turkey takes a hand in the conflict (42).

Although Turkey's warm relationship with Elchibey has clouded its immediate prospects with its ex-Soviet neighbor, economic reality dictates it will remain an ally of Baku in the long term. On the economic front, Turkey offers Azerbaijan an entree to Europe. Azerbaijan is the key to Turkish efforts to enter the big Central Asian and Caucasian markets where Turkey believes it can play an influential role with the region's Turkish speaking peoples (43).

The London Times asserts that the destruction of the Popular Front regime in Azerbaijan was a defeat for Turkey's influence in the former Soviet Union. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has come to see the Turkic republics as an important area of expansion for Turkish economic and political influence. Such moves cause fears among imperial circles in Russia. In recent months a number of articles have appeared in the Russian press warning of the threat from the "New Turkish Great Power" and referring back to historical Russo-Turkish conflicts (44). Nikolai Lisenko's article appeared in September (1993) issue of *Molodaya Kvardia* is a very good example for such articles (45).

Examining the regional role of Turkey, the New York Times has stated that: "Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, an idea emerged in Ankara and Washington that Turkey should expand its role as a bulwark of the Western alliance to that of patron of the emerging nations stretching east to the Chinese border. For the United States, Turkey seemed a reliable proxy to fill the Central Asian vacuum." In paper's view, that dream now appears to be fading. Faced by its own recent economic troubles, this nation of 60 million has been unable to provide the aid to cement its influence over the region. According to the paper, its diplomacy has been hesitant, reflecting a deep fear of being drawn into Central Asia's ethnic strife. Only are now its policy-makers acknowledging how difficult the region's ethnic and political cross currents can be (46).

Analyzing the Azerbaijani June revolution, Britain's "Independent" found gains for Moscow and a reverse for Turkey's eastern ambitions. According to the paper, in recent, years, Turkey was right to blame itself. It had become less diplomatically assertive since the death in April of

President Turgul Ozal, was disenchanted by the cost of playing a regional role and frustrated by the difficulties posed by the borders created by Stalin's carve-up of Caucasus (47).

But one should bear in mind that the strains of war have finally begun to grip this country after 10 years of a far-away fight against Kurdish rebels. Turkey is spending about 6.6 billion dollars a year on the war, a figure which is expected to rise. The projected budget for 1994 is about 32 billion dollars (48).

In spite of all negative trends, however, most score cards put Turkey ahead in the Turkic states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, and Iran ahead in ethnically related Tajikistan.

In a series of articles appeared in "Azadliq", the organ of the Azerbaijan Popular Front, under the headline "The Third War is Over", Azer Murseliev discussed the reaction to the geopolitical vacuum created by the collapse of the USSR, noting that some countries were trying to isolate their borders, while others were using their influence to create a security zone (49). Iran, which is trying to defend itself from the growing influence of Azerbaijan on the large Azerbaijani population in Iran, is relatively successful in Tajikistan, but trying to expand its influence to the entire Muslim nations of the former Soviet Union. In Murseliev's view, the score so far is five—one to Turkey. At the same time, he pointed out, the West was trying to protect itself against the possibility of Turkey's turning its back on the West (50).

Vladimir Danilov, a doctor of history, presented an overview of Turkish foreign policy, particularly with regard to the former Soviet republics, in an article entitled "In Expectation of 'A Century of Turks?'" Danilov first pointed to a change in the Turkish attitude toward Russia, and then glanced back at Moscow, when dealing with the Turkic-Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union.

With regard to the political sphere, Danilov indicated that despite the difficulties, Turkey was striving to institutionalize the principles of Western democracy. He referred to Turkey as a "rare, perhaps singular, secular Muslim state." (51)

Turkey continued to be very interested in its relations with Russia while making efforts to develop economic relations with the former republics of the Soviet Union. With 90 percent of the 2 billion dollars' worth of trade between Turkey and the CIS countries, Russia remains Turkey's main partner (52). Relations between Iran and Russia remained far from what Iran would consider as satisfactory.

Listing the specific programs of Iranian aid, Pravda assessed Turkey, with its modern technology and possibilities for serious capital investment, as the more attractive model for Central Asian states (53).

If Turkey is able to push these states toward these goals, she will make a significant contribution to stability and peace not only in its own territory, but in the entire region. Especially following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, many countries share Turkey's view that it has a vital role in the region's reshaped political geography.

As stated by Financial Times recently, Turkey is increasingly seen in Western Europe as the political and commercial hub of the eastern Mediterranean, as well as a potentially stabilizing influence in the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union. In Europe, as in the U.S., Turkey is viewed as a regional power and a secular democratic model. In a range of trouble spots from the Balkans to Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East, Turkey is the stabilizing factor (54).

FOOTNOTES:

1. Christian Science Monitor, June 11,1992.
2. Washington Times, July 20,1993.
3. Azadliq, December 11,1993 p. 4,5, 6,7,8,9, (The organ of Azerbaijan Popular Front).
4. Turan News Agency, July 10,1993.
5. Ibid.
6. Moscow News, September 7,1992, p.1-8.
7. Millet, November 16,1993 p 4, Azadliq March 20,1992 p 3-6 Azerbaijan Gencleri, May 23,1991.
8. Azerbaijan Gencleri, November 19,1991.
9. Ibid.
10. Seher, December 25,1992, Azadliq October 27,1992.
11. Wall Street Journal, January 7,1993 European edition.
12. Turan News Agency, December 4,1993.
13. Snark News Agency, December 1,1993.
14. Genclik Dergisi, 1990/6.
15. Snark News Agency, December 1,1993.
16. Wall Street Journal, August 5,1993 European edition.
17. New Times International, 38/1993 p 27, Radio Baku January 7,1993.
18. Turan News Agency, August 8,1993, Azadliq, October 12,1993.
19. Azerbaijan (paper) August 14,1993 p 3, Adaliq, October 12,1993.
20. Azerbaijan (paper) August 17,1993 p 1.
21. Istiglal, the organ of National Independence Party, August 3, 1993
22. Turan News Agency, July 30,1993.
23. Die Presse, September 4,1993.
24. New Times International, April/1993 p 7.
25. ibid.
26. Wall Street Journal, May 18,1993 European edition
27. Golos Armenii, August 20,1993.
28. New Times International 40/1993 p 16-17.
29. Izvestia, October 8,1993.
30. Rossiia, December 9-15,1993.
31. Turan News Agency, August 11,1993.
32. Reuter, January 18,1993.
33. Golos Armenii, August 6,1993.
34. Azatamart, September 7-13,1993 p 3.
35. Azatamart, November 2-8,1993 p3.
36. Nezavisimaya Gazeta January 18,1994 p 4-5-8.

37. Azadliq, December 29,1992 p 7.
38. AP, March 31,1992.

39. Bakinskii Rabochii, June 2,1992.
40. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 15,1992 p 5.
41. Azerbaijan (paper) September 25,1993 p 1.
42. London Times, July 27,1993.
43. Reuters, July 2,1993.
44. London Times, June 22,1993.
45. Molodaya Kravdia, September / 1993.
46. New York Times, August 4,1993.
47. The Independent, July 1,1993.
48. AP December 21,1993.
49. Azadliq, December 31,1992 p 7.
50. Azadliq, December 29,1992.
51. Moscow News, February 22,1992 p 12.
52. Izvestia, June 24,1992 p 5.
53. Pravda, March 3,1993.
54. Financial Times, January 21,1994.